Last week, Indonesia’s parliament passed a series of controversial amendments to its Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) Law, which currently only awaits President Prabowo Subianto’s signature before coming into effect. In addition to allowing the appointment of sitting military officers in a wider array of civilian agencies, the revised law expands the TNI’s duties relating to military operations other than war, namely assisting government efforts to counter cyber threats (cyber defense) and assisting in protecting and saving citizens and national interests abroad.
The latter, in particular, could have a considerable impact on the security dynamics of the region. Although its exact implementation will be determined by government regulations, it indicates Indonesia’s increasing concern about the potential for conflict in the region, especially over Taiwan.
Since its independence in 1945, Indonesia’s strategic culture has been mostly inward-looking. This is closely related to the nature of the threats that the nation has faced. According to a book on the history of the TNI published by CSIS Indonesia in 2020, the country conducted 370 military operations between 1945 and 2020, 72 percent of which took place within Indonesia’s borders. To this day, various official documents from the Ministry of Defense and the TNI still view separatism in Papua as the main threat to the nation, especially since the terrorist threat in Poso, Sulawesi, was resolved in 2022.
Indonesia’s defense posture has generally not been prepared for expeditionary warfare. This was evident during the operation to free sailors taken hostage by Somali pirates from the MV Sinar Kudus cargo ship in 2011 in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia. At that time, Indonesia deployed two frigates (the KRI Abdul Halim Perdanakusuma-355 and KRI Yos Sudarso-353), one Landing Platform Dock (ship KRI Banjarmasin-592), and one helicopter, along with several sea riders and landing craft. In addition to being supported by diplomacy, particularly with Singapore, the hostages were released after Indonesia paid a ransom of 40 billion rupiah.
Evacuations have since become a routine task for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, often supported by TNI operations. Between 2011 and 2024, there were 14 operations to evacuate Indonesian citizens abroad – an average of around one incident per year. The largest evacuation was the return of 151,386 Indonesian citizens stuck in various countries due to COVID-19. However, Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) related to conflicts include operations from Syria (2013–2014), where 4,000 Indonesians were evacuated; Yemen (2015), where 1,684 were evacuated; Sudan (2023), where 1,010 Indonesians were evacuated; and Lebanon (2024), involving 79 Indonesians.
The Indonesia Minister of Foreign Affairs estimates there are 350,000 Indonesian citizens in Taiwan, although only 284,751 are registered officially.
In the event of a conflict, the revised version of the TNI Law mandates that the government evacuate these citizens from Taiwan, which is approximately 2,500 kilometers away. This would be far more complicated than Operation Dynamo, the largest successful evacuation operation in history, which saw 338,000 Allied troops evacuated from Dunkirk, France to England in 1940.
Indonesia understands that many ASEAN countries are facing similar challenges. According to official Taiwanese data, the number of foreign residents in Taiwan in 2023 included 239,580 Vietnamese, 153,278 Filipinos, 73,052 Thais, 23,854 Malaysians, and 1,828 Singaporeans. As with Indonesians, the actual numbers are believed to be much higher. Southeast Asian migrant workers have become increasingly important to Taiwan, particularly in light of its growing elderly population.
The new TNI Law’s provision about protecting Indonesian citizens abroad will form the foundation of the military’s strategic plan to achieve this objective. The primary aim of protecting Indonesia’s interests is, of course, ensuring regional security, including in the case of Taiwan. If this effort fails, a second aim must be pursued, namely, an evacuation of Indonesian nationals from the affected areas. Although this dual approach has been discussed among defense stakeholders and foreign policy experts, considering the development of the strategic environment, Indonesia must prepare for both scenarios.
Indonesia’s foreign policy journey has so far been formally “free and active.” However, out of a combination of pragmatic economic interest and concern about the evolving situation in the United States, Indonesia is increasingly inclined towards China. On the other hand, China also has strategic interests in Indonesia related to access to markets and raw materials such as coal and nickel. Therefore, Indonesia hopes that China will exercise restraint over Taiwan. If conflict does erupt in the Taiwan Strait, and China is the aggressor, particularly if Indonesian citizens are affected, there will certainly be domestic pressure on President Prabowo to scale back relations with China. Anti-China factions may exploit this sentiment to undermine Chinese businesses currently thriving in Indonesia, even resorting to physical attacks.
However, in the second scenario, Indonesia hopes there will be an agreed corridor of humanitarian assistance involving all parties. Apart from the Philippines, China would be the nearest place for evacuation.
In both scenarios, it is crucial for Indonesia to engage with ASEAN countries, especially those with shared interests and concerns. Over the past two years, discussions on the importance of a contingency plan have become more frequent and have garnered attention among defense policymakers in Jakarta. Moreover, in the last four years, security in the North Natuna Sea has been relatively stable, with China’s aggressive actions being less pronounced, particularly compared to issues such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing by Vietnamese fishing vessels. At the same time, China’s military aggression around Taiwan has increased. Developments in China and the U.S. are also seen as variables that could lead to conflict in Taiwan.
While Indonesia tends to lean towards China, it remains more comfortable collaborating with ASEAN countries. In two recent surveys conducted by the research group Indonesian Strategic and Defence Studies (ISDS) in cooperation with Litbang Kompas, one in January 2024 (312 respondents) and one in December (321 respondents), ASEAN was perceived as the preferred partner for safeguarding Indonesia’s sovereignty, as noted by 39.1 percent of respondents in the January survey, followed by the U.S. and China.
However, coordinating efforts with ASEAN countries is not easy due to their differing domestic politics, foreign policies, and relations with China and the U.S. Countries such as the Philippines have had frequent conflicts with Beijing and are close to Washington. Conversely, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos have tended to align with China and are expected to remain so aligned for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, countries like Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam seek to maintain their neutrality or balance their relations with China and the U.S., depending on their situation.
Despite these differences, ASEAN countries will inevitably face domestic pressure to evacuate their citizens from Taiwan in the event of a kinetic conflict. The majority of migrant workers in Taiwan who are from these countries are the backbones of their families. It would be imperative for their respective governments to repatriate them to avoid domestic political instability.
So far, ASEAN has relied on its “Guidelines for the Provision of Emergency Assistance by ASEAN Missions in Third Countries to Nationals of ASEAN Member Countries in Crisis Situations,” adopted in 2006, which outlines the scope of mutual assistance during crises. However, Indonesia has not implemented these guidelines comprehensively and has been preoccupied with domestic issues instead. The changes in the TNI Law indicate an increasing interest from Indonesia in this matter and a shift towards a more outward-looking approach to addressing immediate threats.
As a traditional leader within ASEAN, Indonesia’s change in orientation could lead it to become a cornerstone of ASEAN solidarity on these questions. The shared interests between ASEAN countries may facilitate cooperation, particularly in developing a joint contingency plan on technical aspects such as evacuation routes and assets, as well as strategic aspects of how to cooperate with China, the U.S., and other countries like Japan, South Korea, and even Australia to address this crisis. For Taiwan, practically speaking, a unified ASEAN effort to evacuate their citizens would be easier to respond to than addressing each of these countries individually.
How Indonesia, particularly the TNI, will implement the new law remains unclear. Many domestic factors will influence foreign policy and the TNI’s evolution toward a more outward-looking orientation. Moreover, President Prabowo also sees the urgency of addressing food security, partly through greater military involvement
If the TNI focuses on non-military tasks, this will undoubtedly strain the TNI’s resources, raising questions about its ability to achieve its external goals.
