The dismissal of the Balochistan provincial government by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in February 1973 marked a pivotal turning point in Pakistan’s history. This drastic move not only ignited one of the most prolonged and violent insurgencies in Balochistan but also transformed the conflict into a regional geopolitical battleground. Deep-seated domestic grievances—rooted in decades of economic underdevelopment, political marginalisation and cultural neglect—provided fertile ground for resistance, while external state actors sought to exploit these internal divisions to further their strategic interests.
Even today, a decade after the launch of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and following 78 review meetings, Gwadar, the centrepiece of this multibillion-dollar initiative, continues to struggle with a lack of essential infrastructure, particularly clean water and reliable electricity.
This article examines the multifaceted foreign involvement in Balochistan following Bhutto’s crackdown. I explore the roles played by Afghanistan under President Daud Khan, India’s covert operations via RAW, Iraq’s limited yet strategic support, and the backing provided by Iran to maintain a stable Pakistan. I also address the enduring influence of the Cold War on these developments and consider the Pashtun question’s impact on regional dynamics. Drawing on declassified U.S. and British intelligence documents and scholarly works by researchers such as Avinash Paliwal, Anatol Lieven, Sashanka S. Banerjee, Hassan Abbas, Ahmed Rashid and Willem Vogelsang, this article presents a detailed, fact-checked account of how foreign intervention shaped the Baloch insurgency.
Background: Historical Grievances and Early Insurgency
Balochistan’s contentious relationship with the Pakistani state has deep historical roots. Since its forced incorporation into Pakistan in 1948, the Baloch people have consistently demanded greater autonomy, control over their natural resources, and recognition of their distinct cultural identity. These demands were not new; indeed, historical insurgencies pre-dated Bhutto’s era. For example, the incident involving Nowroz Khan in the late 1950s illustrates early resistance in the region. Nowroz Khan, a prominent Baloch leader, agreed to surrender on 15 May 1959 in exchange for amnesty. However, when he descended from the hills, he, along with approximately 150 of his followers – including his sons and nephews – were arrested on charges of insurgency against the state. Then, on 15 July 1960, seven of the rebel leaders were executed by hanging in Hyderabad Jail. This brutal episode not only deepened regional resentment but also underscored the Pakistani state’s longstanding approach of severe repression towards Baloch nationalist movements.
In the early 1970s, these historical grievances provided the backdrop for renewed demands for autonomy. In the 1970 general elections, the National Awami Party (NAP) – a leftist-nationalist coalition advocating for provincial autonomy – emerged as the dominant political force in Balochistan. Under the leadership of Ataullah Mengal, the NAP government implemented policies emphasising local governance, economic development and cultural preservation. However, Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) viewed the NAP’s stance with deep suspicion, though not without justification. One of Bhutto’s first acts upon assuming power on 20 December 1971 was to lift the ban on the NAP, imposed by General Yahya Khan. Bhutto had absolute power and was under no compulsion to do it but he wanted to start a process of reconciliation.
Decades later, Sashanka S. Banerjee, who was posted as an Indian diplomat in London in 1971-72, made startling disclosures. He is also the author of India, Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh Liberation, & Pakistan: A Political Treatise, published in 2011. According to Banerjee, Abdus Samad Azad, Bangladesh’s leader organised a meeting that took place at the Charing Cross Hotel near Trafalgar Square in London on December 16, 1971—the day Bangladesh achieved independence. This secret conclave, referred to as the "London Club," was attended by prominent Baloch leaders, including Khair Bakhsh Marri, Ataullah Mengal, and Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti. The assembly deliberated on the prospect of Balochistan's liberation from Pakistan, drawing parallels with Bangladesh's recent secession.
In February 1973, citing allegations that the provincial leadership was conspiring with foreign powers to establish an independent Balochistan, Bhutto dismissed the NAP-led government. The government further claimed that a raid on the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad had uncovered a cache of arms intended for Baloch rebels. This provided the official justification for a widespread crackdown, which soon escalated into a full-blown armed insurgency.
Afghanistan’s Role Under President Daud Khan
Afghanistan’s involvement in the Baloch insurgency must be understood within the broader context of the Pashtunistan dispute—a territorial and cultural conflict rooted in Afghan claims over Pashtun-majority areas in Pakistan. Since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, Afghan governments have refused to recognise the Durand Line, a border drawn during British colonial rule, and have supported nationalist movements among both Pashtuns and Baloch. In 1973, when Sardar Daud Khan seized power in Afghanistan, he inherited these longstanding grievances and sought to assert Afghan independence by adopting an assertive, independent foreign policy.
RAW actively supported Baloch rebels by providing arms, training, and logistical support. Indian operatives maintained liaison offices along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to facilitate the transfer of weapons and financial assistance
Daud Khan’s regime viewed Pakistani centralisation as a threat not only to regional stability but also to Afghanistan’s national interests. By supporting dissident groups in Balochistan, Daud Khan aimed to undermine Pakistan’s control over its western regions and advance the broader cause of Pashtunistan. Declassified British Foreign Office memoranda from 1974–1976 reveal that:
“Afghan authorities under President Daud Khan have pursued a policy of providing refuge to dissident groups opposing Pakistani centralisation, a move that is viewed as part of a broader strategy to challenge Pakistani hegemony in the region.”
Asylum and Logistical Support
U.S. State Department cables from 1974 further confirm that Pakistan was deeply troubled by Afghanistan’s support for separatist elements. One such cable states:
“Pakistan has expressed concerns over Afghan support for Baloch separatists, noting that safe havens in Afghanistan are prolonging the insurgency.”
Under Daud Khan, Afghanistan not only provided asylum for Baloch insurgents but also offered critical logistical support. Bases established in Afghan territory allowed rebels to regroup, rearm, and conduct cross-border operations. Furthermore, Daud Khan actively pursued negotiations with Pakistani officials over the disputed Durand Line. According to Mahmood Ali Khan Chaudhry in Marshalla ka Siasi Andaz, secret discussions were held between Bhutto and Daud Khan, with proposals that included recognising the Durand Line in exchange for Afghan withdrawal of support for Baloch insurgents. Although these negotiations ultimately collapsed after Bhutto’s overthrow in 1977, they demonstrate the extent to which Afghanistan under Daud Khan was willing to influence the conflict in Pakistan.
Impact on the Pashtun Question
The involvement of Afghanistan under Daud Khan was also intertwined with the broader Pashtunistan issue. Many Afghan nationalists saw the Baloch insurgency as part of a wider struggle for the rights and territories of Pashtuns, whose lands were divided by the Durand Line. By offering support to both Baloch and Pashtun dissidents, Daud Khan aimed to weaken Pakistan’s control and bolster Afghan claims over disputed regions. Willem Vogelsang’s The Afghans documents this policy, noting that Daud Khan’s outreach to prominent Pashtun leaders was a key element of his strategy. Such policies heightened tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, contributing to the protracted nature of the insurgency.
India’s Covert Operations and Strategic Interests
Following the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, India was determined to further weaken Pakistan by supporting separatist movements on its western frontier. The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India’s premier intelligence agency, played a central role in this effort. In his book My Enemy’s Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the US Withdrawal, Avinash Paliwal documents RAW’s covert operations in Balochistan. According to Paliwal:
“RAW actively supported Baloch rebels by providing arms, training, and logistical support. Indian operatives maintained liaison offices along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to facilitate the transfer of weapons and financial assistance.”
Operational Details and Strategic Objectives
Indian support to the insurgency encompassed several initiatives:
- Armaments: RAW supplied small arms and explosives to Baloch guerrilla fighters, enabling them to engage in prolonged guerrilla warfare.
- Training: Baloch militants received training in undisclosed locations, which enhanced their operational effectiveness against Pakistani security forces.
- Intelligence Coordination: By operating liaison offices along the porous border with Afghanistan, RAW ensured that insurgent groups had access to safe havens and could receive timely intelligence, thereby sustaining their campaign.
This covert support was part of India’s broader strategy to destabilise Pakistan’s western regions, thereby forcing Pakistan to divert military resources away from its eastern front. Sashanka S. Banerjee’s India, Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh Liberation & Pakistan (A Political Treatise) reinforces this view by documenting how India’s historical use of proxy forces during the 1971 conflict set the precedent for subsequent interventions. Anatol Lieven, in Pakistan: A Hard Country, also notes that India viewed the insurgency as a valuable opportunity to erode Pakistani unity and weaken its government from within.
Iraq’s Involvement: A Modest but Strategic Contribution
The discovery of arms at the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad in 1973 initially provided Bhutto with a rationale for dismissing the Balochistan government. However, subsequent declassified U.S. intelligence reports from 1974–1975 indicate that Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, provided financial and military assistance to Baloch separatists. British diplomatic cables from 1975, available via the UK National Archives, state:
“Iraqi intelligence agents were facilitating the transfer of funds to separatist elements in Balochistan.”
Iraq’s involvement was driven by a combination of strategic and ideological factors:
- Countering Iranian Influence: Bhutto’s close ties with the Shah of Iran made Pakistan a target for Iraqi opposition. By supporting Baloch insurgents, Iraq aimed to weaken Pakistan, thereby indirectly curtailing Iranian influence in the region.
- Pan-Arab Ideology: The Ba’athist regime in Iraq, led by Saddam Hussein, viewed Bhutto’s government as too pro-Western. Supporting separatist movements in Pakistan aligned with Iraq’s broader ideological and strategic objectives.
While Iraq’s contribution was modest relative to India’s extensive operations, its support added another layer to the multifaceted foreign intervention that prolonged the conflict.
While direct Soviet support for Baloch insurgents is not extensively documented, the Soviet Union’s broader strategic posture in South Asia played an indirect role in shaping external interventions
Iran’s Support for the Central Government
In stark contrast to the support provided to insurgents by Afghanistan, India, and Iraq, Iran backed Bhutto’s policies with both military and diplomatic resources. The Shah of Iran regarded Baloch separatism as a direct threat to internal stability, especially given the presence of a substantial Baloch population in Iran. In 1974, Iran deployed military advisers and attack helicopters to assist Pakistani forces, and Iranian units conducted cross-border operations against Baloch rebels.
Ahmed Rashid, in Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, argues that Iran’s support was driven by its strategic imperative to secure its eastern border and maintain a stable, pro-Western Pakistan. This backing not only bolstered Pakistan’s military efforts but also provided a diplomatic counterbalance to the external interventions that sought to destabilise the country.
The Pashtun Question: Overlapping Nationalist Claims
The Pashtun question has been a longstanding source of tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Durand Line, drawn by the British in colonial times, divides the Pashtun population between the two countries. Since 1947, successive Afghan governments have challenged this border, arguing that it is an artificial demarcation that undermines the rights of the Pashtun people. This issue, often referred to as the Pashtunistan dispute, became particularly salient during the insurgency in Balochistan, as the struggle for autonomy often overlapped with demands for greater Pashtun rights.
Afghanistan’s support for the insurgency was not limited solely to Baloch nationalist groups; it extended to Pashtun dissidents as well. Under President Daud Khan, Afghanistan’s policy was to support any movement that could undermine Pakistan’s central authority and advance the cause of Pashtun nationalism. This dual support for Baloch and Pashtun groups created a complex situation in which internal ethnic grievances were interwoven with broader geopolitical rivalries. Willem Vogelsang’s The Afghans details how Daud Khan’s outreach to Pashtun nationalist leaders contributed to a heightened sense of unrest along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. Such policies deepened the longstanding rivalry between Afghanistan and Pakistan and complicated efforts to resolve the insurgency.
The Broader Cold War Context and International Monitoring
The early 1970s were dominated by Cold War rivalries, and South Asia was a critical theatre in this global contest. Both the United States and Britain were deeply invested in Pakistan’s stability as part of their efforts to contain Soviet influence. Declassified U.S. State Department cables—such as the one dated 12 April 1974—demonstrate that U.S. policymakers were keenly aware of reports that regional actors were exploiting unrest in Balochistan. Such cables provide verified evidence that the possibility of external interference was a serious concern for Washington.
Similarly, British Foreign Office memoranda from 1973 to 1975, which can be accessed through the UK National Archives, repeatedly warned that “British intelligence was tracking reports that insurgent elements in Balochistan were receiving covert assistance from regional adversaries.” These authentic documents confirm that both the U.S. and Britain were monitoring the situation closely and were aware of the broader geopolitical implications.
Soviet Influence
While direct Soviet support for Baloch insurgents is not extensively documented, the Soviet Union’s broader strategic posture in South Asia played an indirect role in shaping external interventions. The USSR’s growing influence in Afghanistan—especially after the 1978 Saur Revolution—had significant repercussions for regional stability. Although the Soviets did not actively support the insurgency in Balochistan during the early 1970s, their competition with the United States and its allies meant that every move by regional actors was viewed through the prism of superpower rivalry.
Pakistan’s Military and Diplomatic Response
In response to the insurgency, the Pakistani military launched a series of aggressive counterinsurgency operations in Balochistan. These operations were aimed at reasserting central control and quelling the widespread armed rebellion. The military campaign was marked by intense fighting and significant collateral damage. Thousands of lives were lost, and vast swathes of the province were left in ruins. The counterinsurgency operations, though ultimately successful in restoring a degree of order, deepened the longstanding grievances among the Baloch people and laid the groundwork for future conflicts.
Declassified documents from the U.S. State Department and British Foreign Office offer verifiable evidence that Western governments were acutely aware of—and concerned about—the external dimensions of Pakistan’s internal conflict
On the diplomatic front, Pakistan attempted to counter the influence of external support by seeking alliances with regional partners such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. Bhutto’s government consistently portrayed the insurgency as a product of foreign meddling, citing evidence such as the arms cache allegedly found at the Iraqi embassy as proof of external conspiracy.
Secret negotiations reportedly took place between Bhutto and Afghan President Daud Khan. According to Mahmood Ali Khan Chaudhry (who was the Federal Interior Secretary in 1977) in Marshalla ka Siasi Andaz, Bhutto was prepared to recognise the Durand Line as the official border in exchange for an end to Afghan support for Baloch separatists. Bhutto’s memoir If I Am Assassinated also references these negotiations, although they ultimately collapsed after his overthrow in 1977.
Long-Term Implications and Legacy
The protracted insurgency, fuelled by both domestic grievances and external intervention, left deep scars on Baloch society. The heavy-handed military response, combined with the perception of foreign interference, entrenched feelings of marginalisation among the Baloch people. Over the decades, the legacy of the 1970s insurgency has contributed to persistent calls for greater autonomy and even secession. Scholars like Hassan Abbas in Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism argue that the cycle of violence and repression during this period has had lasting repercussions, stunting political and economic development in Balochistan.
The intervention of external powers also had significant implications for the broader region. The dual support for both Baloch and Pashtun nationalist movements deepened the longstanding rivalry between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The unresolved Pashtunistan issue continues to fuel tensions between the two neighbours, affecting regional security and cooperation. The asylum and logistical support provided by Afghanistan under President Daud Khan, as detailed by Willem Vogelsang, remains a key element in understanding the historical complexity of Afghan-Pakistani relations.
The foreign interventions in Balochistan during the early 1970s must also be viewed through the broader lens of the Cold War. External powers, notably the United States and Britain, were deeply concerned with the stability of Pakistan as a strategic counterweight to Soviet expansion. The extensive monitoring of Pakistan’s internal unrest via declassified U.S. State Department cables and British Foreign Office memoranda underscores the global significance of the Baloch insurgency. Even though direct Soviet involvement was limited during this period, the broader superpower rivalry influenced the strategic calculations of all regional players, further complicating the conflict.
Lessons for Contemporary Policymakers
The multifaceted foreign involvement in the Baloch insurgency offers several important lessons. Firstly, the exploitation of internal divisions by external actors can significantly prolong conflicts, making resolution more difficult. Secondly, the interweaving of domestic grievances with international strategic interests complicates nation-building and reconciliation efforts. Finally, understanding historical patterns of foreign interference is crucial for contemporary policymakers seeking to build resilient institutions and promote national unity in regions marked by internal strife.
Conclusion
The Baloch insurgency that followed Bhutto’s dismissal of the provincial government in 1973 was not merely an internal rebellion—it was a multifaceted geopolitical conflict shaped by both domestic grievances and external interventions. Afghanistan, under President Daud Khan, played a decisive role by providing asylum and logistical support to dissident groups while advancing the broader Pashtunistan agenda. India, through RAW, covertly supplied arms, training and financial support to Baloch insurgents, aiming to destabilise Pakistan’s western regions. Iraq contributed modestly, motivated by its opposition to Iranian influence and alignment against Bhutto’s pro-Western policies, while Iran itself backed the central government with military advisers and equipment to suppress the rebellion.
Declassified documents from the U.S. State Department and British Foreign Office offer verifiable evidence that Western governments were acutely aware of—and concerned about—the external dimensions of Pakistan’s internal conflict. Coupled with scholarly analyses by Paliwal, Banerjee, Lieven, Abbas, Rashid, and Vogelsang, the evidence reveals a complex web of foreign involvement that not only prolonged the insurgency but also left an enduring legacy. This legacy continues to influence Baloch nationalist movements and shape regional dynamics in South Asia today.
As Pakistan moves forward, addressing its internal divisions will require not only domestic reform but also a critical understanding of historical foreign interference. The Baloch insurgency of the 1970s serves as a stark reminder that local conflicts often become arenas for international power plays—a lesson that remains as relevant today as it was nearly half a century ago.